| Obama's permanent depression |
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| by Spengler | Fri, Oct 9, 2009, 08:47 PM | ||||||||||||||||||||
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President Barack Obama may be remembered for permanent depression, the way that Leon Trotsky's name is linked with permanent revolution. Fiscal stimulus combined with near-zero interest rates have proven to be a toxic cocktail for the United States, the macroeconomic equivalent of barbiturates and alcohol.
That doesn't include another three million long-term discouraged workers - those who want to work but who have long since stopped looking. That would take the number up to 20%. In past recoveries, a number of economists observed, all the job growth came from small business, but small business is lagging in the present crisis. The financial crisis crushed the entrepreneurs, as surely as Joseph Stalin crushed the kulaks, the relatively affluent peasants. Obama inherited a crisis, to be sure, but he has made it much worse. America is in the kind of trap into which Japan fell during the "lost decade" of the 1990s, whence it never really emerged. In the Keynesian world of Larry Summers, director of the White House's National Economic Council, and the Obama economics team, the problem is that Americans save too much and spend too little. To restart the economy, the government has to spend money for them - hence the US$800 billion stimulus package. There are two things terribly wrong with this notion. The first is that it is simply a matter of what John Maynard Keynes called the "marginal propensity to consume". Americans have saved almost nothing during the past 10 years, relying instead on home equity that now has vaporized. The proportion of Americans over 60 will jump to 25% from 19% during the next 10 years, an unprecedented shift. Americans must save to compensate for past profligacy, from a lower starting point after the destruction of so much wealth, and with lower prospective returns. The demand for savings is bottomless. The second problem is that even if the government borrows money, the money has to come from somewhere. Right now it's coming from households who choose to save rather than borrow, and from the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve or the banks, as well as foreign investors. A quick walk through the numbers puts the problem in context. Lenders to the US federal government, first half 2009.
Monetization of debt remains a possibility, and to some extent would only continue the current trend. Total Federal Reserve Bank credit outstanding has more than doubled in the year to November 6, 2008, rising by $1.2 trillion to $2.06 trillion. This reflects loans, securities purchases, and related actions by the Fed to bail out the financial system. If the deflation persists, the Federal Reserve may be compelled to purchase US government debt ... The parallels between America in 2009 and Japan in 1989 are uncanny. An asset price bubble has collapsed, just before a tsunami of prospective retirements that the asset bubble was supposed to fund. Demand for savings is bottomless, and the government satisfies demands for savings by running a huge deficit and issuing debt. The crippled banking system borrows at an interest rate of zero and buys government securities. And the economy shrivels up and dies.
Spengler is channeled by David P Goldman, Associate Editor of First Things.
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written by Tom Pauken , October 10, 2009 Good economic analysis by David Goldman. Even the Obama policymakers are starting to get nervous that what they are doing isn't working to create jobs and encourage capital investment in the private sector. We need to remember that the Kemp-Roth Job Creation Act which President Reagan got Congress to pass in 1981 to deal with a sluggish economy took two years to kick in and have an impact. There is nothing in the Obama stimulus package that will have a long term positive impact on the overall American economy. We will continue to see rising unemployment and the hallowing out of our manufacturing base unless we change directions soon. Write comment
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